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Science and Politics

Over in Twitter-land, Razib Khan wrote:



I tweeted something cryptic about this, because I found it an interesting comment, but not one that really lends itself to a tweet-length reply. Both the subject matter and my relationship with it are a little too complicated to parcel out a couple hundred characters at a time. But, you know, I have this little-used blog platform on which I can type stuff at greater length, so let’s see if that still works.

I’m not really certain what specific data reinterpretations Razib is referring to, but I think what he’s getting at is that he’s become more convinced in the correctness of the critique that science has political elements to it. Which is to say that what gets accepted into the “scientific consensus” is not entirely determined by objective criteria, but is shaped by ideology and power. Results that are more consistent with a preferred narrative, or that are more congenial to a powerful elite are more likely to be accepted. When there’s a shift in the narrative, or who holds the levers of power, the prior consensus can be discarded and the same basic results reinterpreted to suit the new narrative preferred by the new elite.

This is a critique that grows out of the “science studies” corners of academia, and has not exactly been enthusiastically embraced by working scientists. This is the kind of thing that a certain type of STEM professional is prone to denouncing as “postmodernism” (kind of a dubious classification in a lot of ways, but whatever), and people get very worked up about this. 

As with any academic field, there is a branch of this that descends into self-parodic nonsense, but I think there’s absolutely a core of truth to the critique. I don’t see how anybody who’s gone through the process of getting a journal article published can deny that there are social and political elements to science– every time a referee forces you to add dubiously relevant citations to papers you’re pretty sure they’re an author on, that’s a low-level example of this.  I don’t think it’s even all that hard to find examples, particularly in 2020, of the “scientific consensus” being bent in directions that conform with a particular political narrative at a much higher level.

The thing I go back and forth on a bit is to what degree this is actually useful.

To be sure, there’s a cynical sense in which being aware of the social and political aspects of science is useful in that it helps you “play the game.” This takes the form of the tacit knowledge advisors pass on to students in the process of writing papers and grant proposals: how to frame results in keeping with the preferred narratives, how to anticipate the dubiously relevant citations that will be demanded by referees from powerful groups, what buzzwords to work in to enhance your chances of getting funding, etc. Recognizing that stuff as an inherent part of the process, rather than a perversion of some imagined “pure science” can make a lot of things go more smoothly.

It’s less clear to me that this is helpful to the process of actually doing science in a day-to-day operational manner. That is, knowing that there is a political element to the process is not all that helpful in choosing what questions to research, or deciding how to attack them. I suspect this is why, to the endless frustration of actual philosophers, Popper’s falsification model remains so popular among working scientists. It may fail as philosophy, but it continues to be a useful heuristic for thinking about how to approach research questions. Asking “What measurement could I do that would prove this model wrong?” is a reasonably good path to generating ideas that can be put to practical use, in a way that “What is the prevailing narrative around this topic?” is not.

I also end up having a problem with the sloganized version of these ideas, which generally ends up as something like, “Science is inherently political.” To the extent that this means that elements of power and ideology help determine what gets accepted as part of the “scientific consensus,” again, I think that’s clearly true, and ought to be relatively uncontroversial. Unfortunately, it gets used in (at least) two other ways.

The first of these is as a justification for talking about the political and social context around scientific problems. I’m basically okay with this– I agree that it’s essential for discussing scientific problems that relate very directly to policy matters (things like climate and many areas of public health). I also think it’s perfectly reasonable to, for example, talk about how Einstein’s early career was affected by the virulent anti-Semitism of the day. To the extent that we’re teaching students to be scientists, it’s important for them to be aware of how power and ideology shape the acceptance of ideas.

The version of “Science is inherently political” that I’m less okay with is the one that transforms this into an active obligation to teach a particular narrative about politics. Again, it’s not the idea of putting political content into a science course per se that I find problematic– there are decent arguments that this enhances and complements the scientific content for (some) students, so if you’re moved to do that, have at it. What I find troubling is the obligation and the particularity, and more the latter than the former.

That is, when “Science is inherently political” gets amended with “…therefore, we must teach political content in science classes,” it’s not a general “Every teacher should present ideas of politics.” The people who usually make that amendment very actively do not want, for example, the sort of STEM faculty who rail against a cartoon-bogeyman version of “postmodernism” sharing their worldview in class. Most people proposing an active obligation to include political content in science syllabi want that content to support and conform to a particular narrative about politics. And as much as I generally agree with that narrative, I find that imposition troubling.

I think what bothers me is that this ends up turning what is a generally reasonable critique into a nakedly cynical power play. What started as the (largely correct) observation that the “scientific consensus” has to some extent been shaped by ideology and power turns into a program of actively shaping it to conform to a particular preferred ideology. That makes me very uneasy. “Power and ideology shape science, and thus you should be wary of this, and think about whose interests are served by particular results” is a valid criticism and a useful guide to future action. On the other hand, “Science has long been shaped by power and wrong ideology, therefore we should bend it into the shape of our new and correct Ideology 2.0″ seems like it goes to some bad places.

So, as noted up top, my relationship to “science studies” and ideas derived therefrom is kind of complicated. As a result, I try to keep the whole thing kind of at arm’s length. Which I’m kind of blowing to hell by writing this out, but it’s been useful to (somewhat) clarify my thoughts for myself, which is one of the parts of blogging I kind of miss…